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Introduction
The last half of the twentieth century saw the gradual but steady
burgeoning of work on the various permutations of what Francis Yates,
as the most famous exemplar of this development, called 'the Hermetic
tradition' or what others have almost as influentially classed with the set
of 'alternative religions' of the West, under the general rubric of the
humanities, Le., scholarship governed by rules of ratiocination, or
dependence upon data that can be shared, evidence that can be evaluated,
and judgments that can be assessed by others.! This drift away from
starkly apologetic and polemic treatments of such religious traditions has
lead to an appreciation of their contributions to the making of
modemity.2 Recently this trajectory has culminated in a new generation
G. Lease, 'What are the Humanities and Why do they Matter? The Case of Religion
and the Public Life', Bulletin of the Council ofSocieties for the Study of Religion,
1998, Vol. 27, No. 4, p. 93.
2 A comprehensive examination of the history behind this development lies outside the
scope of this exploratory study. However, I feel that it would be useful for the reader
unfamiliar with the field to briefly and in a limited fashion identify studies that have
been part of this revaluation. Francis Yates has already been mentioned; her
argument for the pivotal role of 'the Hennetic tradition' in the birth of modern
science was first presented in Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, Chicago,
1964. The so-called 'Yates thesis' has been tentatively accepted in a historically
revised and weak form by contemporary historians of science; cl H.F. Cohen~ The
Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry~ Chicago~ 1994, pp. 169-183.
Other germinal figures focusing on the 'magic' complex and early modem studies
include W. Schumaker, The Occult Sciences in the Renaissance; A Study of
Intellectual Patterns, Berkeley, 1972; K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of
Magic. Studies in Popular Belief in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England,
London, 1973; and most recently S. J. Tambiah, Magic, science, religion, and the
scope of rationality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. C. Mclntosh,
Eliphas Lev; and the French Occult Revival, London, 1972 and The Rosicrucians.
The History and Mythology of an Occult Order, Wellingborough, 1987; J. Webb,
The Occult Underground, La Salle, 1974 and The Occult Establishment, Glasgow,
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of scholars who regard their sum as an object of study in its own right,
an epistemic shift reminiscent of the emergence of a scholarly study of
religion in the nineteenth century and with which these scholars have
self-consciously aligned themselves. 1 This realization among a number
of scholars has seen an increased tendency toward wider consultation
about and institutionalization of 'western esotericism,' seen to be both a
newly emergent subdiscipline and an integral research programme.2
Such an alliance, while strategic, is far from straightforward. In
identifying with religious studies, the study of western esotericism
recapitulates and becomes caught up in the very same debates through
which religion became the object of Western scholarly research. The
identity of other fields does not depend (solely) on the study of religion;
ipso facto, the broadly scientific study of western esotericism, like the
ancestral 'science of religion' before it, will also become, to borrow
from Clifford Geertz, 'a conflicted discipline, perpetually in search of
ways to escape its condition, perpetually failing to find them'.3 The
2
3
1976, have contributed to the historiography of post-Enlightenment developments,
with varying degrees of polemic, particularly virulent in Webb's case.
For more on the ways in which religion became the object of scientific research in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see A. L. Molendijk and P. Pels,
Religion in the Making: The Emergence ofthe Sciences ofReligion, Leiden, 1998. I
will look at the problematic question of 'disciplinarity' in religion studies and
consequently western esotericism later in this paper.
In summary, there are now two academic chairs devoted to western esotericism: the
'History ofesoteric and mystical currents in modem and contemporary Europe' since
1979 in the fifth section of the Ecole Practique des Hautes Etudes in Paris; and,
since 1999, the 'History of Hennetic Philosophy and Related Currents' at the
University of Amsterdam. In addition, the latter has established the world's first
complete (sub)department within the auspices of the Department of Theology and
Religious Studies. Initiatives devoted more to sub-categories of the field have been
organised by international academic organizations, such as the American Academy of
Religion (AAR). On the other hand, esotericism as a total field has been included by
the International Association for the History of Religions (lAHR) since its
seventeenth Congress in 1995. For a more comprehensive history, see A. Faivre and
K.-C. Voss, 'Western Esotericism and the Science of Religion', Numen, 1995, Vo!.
42, No. 1, pp. 48-77; W. Hanegraaff, 'Introduction,' in A. Faivre and W. Hanegraaff,
Western Esotericism and the Science ofReligion, Peeters, Leuven, 1998 (Hanegraaff,
1998a); and Afdeling Theologie en Religiestudies, History of Hermetic Philosophy
and Related Currents: Report 1999-2000, Amsterdam, 2001.
C. Geertz, 'Culture War', The New York Review ofBooks, 1995, Vol. 14, No. 19, p.
4.
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purpose of this exploratory study, then, is to explore the categories of
western esotericism rather as sites of contestation by questioning aspects
of the disciplinary consensus arrived at thus far and to give voice to
muted discourses within the field. The constitution of imagination as the
central element of esoteric discourse has become foundational to this
consensus. Of the esotericist voices which speak otherwise, that of the
little-studied Russian-born esotericists G.I Gurdjieff and P.D. Ouspensky
will be presented here.
Terms Of Reference And A Cursory Examination Of The State Of
Research
The author assumes on behalf of the interested generalist only a fleeting
acquaintance with all but the most exotic, topical and tenuous elements
of contemporary esotericism, such as the New Age and Wicca, for
example. l Even those aware of the consolidating developments in the
study of western esotericism may be unfamiliar with P.D. Ouspensky
(1878-1947), his significant contribution to a constellation of esoteric
doctrines and practices known collectively as the 'Fourth Way', and his
relationship to another important though little-studied esotericist, G. I.
Gurdjieff (1886?-1949).2 Given this situation and the still marginalised
space of esotericism in the academy as a whole, what will be attempted
here is a brief preliminary heuristic orientation to the terms that will be
used and to those elements of research in this field useful to this study.
The 'Fourth Way'
If the study of western esotericism can still be regarded as embryonic,
comprehensive academic treatments of the 'Fourth Way' are even more
See W. Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the
Mirror of Secular Thought, Leiden, 1996 and B. Ankarloo and S. Clark (eds.),
Witchcraft and Magic in Europe: The Twentieth Century, Philadelphia, 1999,
respectively.
2 So little studied is Gurdjieff that even his date of birth has not been established to
any satisfaction, hence the question mark; 1886 was adduced by Gurdjieffs most
recent biographer, who also discusses the alternative dates of birth. See J. Moore,
GurdjiefJ: The Anatomy ola Myth, London, 1991, pp. 339-340.
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nascent, and it would be fair to say that most studies still fall into either
the apologetic or the polemic. Again, historiography is also just
beginning. Unfortunately, given the limitations of this study, this is not
the place to make an assessment or anything but the briefest of historical
accounts.! Rather, from the literature I will distil a brief preliminary
heuristic definition that others can attempt to falsify.
Any reader who wishes to engage with the extant literature should consult W.J.
Driscoll, Gurdjieff: An Annotated Bibliography, New York, 1985, but should bear in
mind its apologetic cast (of a distinctively 'heresiological' nature), produced as it
was under the auspices of The Gurdjieff Foundation, which was established to
preserve (or, as others in the Fourth Way would argue, embalm; for example, see the
'unorthodox Gurdjeffean', J.G. Bennett, Witness: The Story of a Search, London,
1962, p. 233) the teachings of Gurdjieff from vulgariZJition and 'deflection' from
their 'original' intent.
Verifiable information about Gurdjieffs dates only from his arrival in Moscow in
1911; he was in Russia and Georgia until 1920, emigrating to western Europe via
Istanbul. In 1922 Gurdjieff and his followers moved to Fontainebleau, south of Paris,
where he established the Institute for the Harmonious Development of Man and
which operated into the late 1930s. He visited the United States in 1924, were he also
found followers, and again in 1930. For the decade 1924 to 1934 Gurdjieff dedicated
himself to writing books to communicate his ideas. From the early 1930s until his
death in 1949 Gurdjieff lived in Paris, with occasional trips to America. The scarcity
of reliable information about him and the Fourth Way in general is evidence of few
attempts at historiography. William Patterson has attempted something of a
comprehensive historiography of Gurdjieff, Struggle ofthe Magicians. Exploring the
Student-Teacher Relationship, Fairfax, 1996. However, as his autobiography, Eating
the 'I'. An Account of the Fourth Way - The Way of Transformation in Ordinary
Life, Fairfax, 1992, along with a catalogue of 'deflections' from an assumed
'orthodoxy' as intended by Gurdjieff (Taking With the Left Hand, Enneagram
Craze, People of the Bookmark & The Mouravieff 'Phenomenon', Fairfax, 1998)
evince, Patterson's historiographical work suffers from the opposite tendency of
apologetics. Similarly, H.J. Reyner, Ouspensky: The Unsung Genius, London, 1981
oscillates between biography and hagiography without clear demarcation. Recently,
though, a number of biographies which seek to avoid such sharp dichotomies (P.B.
Taylor, Shadows of Heaven: GurdjiejJ and Toomer, Maine, 1998; and K.F.
Rosenblatt, Rene Daumal: The Life and Work ofa Mystic Guide, Albany, 1999), as
well as histories of the Theosophical Society and Russian esotericism in general that
place Gurdj ieff and Ouspensky in their contexts (M. Carlson, 'No Religion Higher
Than the Truth '. A History of the Theosophical Movement in Russia, 1875-1922,
Princeton, 1993; B.G. Rosenthal, The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture, Ithaca,
1997; but see also W.F. Ryan, The Bathhouse at Midnight: Magic in Russia,
Pennsylvania,1999) are also beginning to emerge, which are slowly shedding more
light).
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Firstly, in an historical sense, it is the set of doctrines and practices
developed by Gurdjieff and those sets of doctrines and practices
developed by others through contact with Gurdjieff (either directly or
indirectly). Taken all together, they constitute a unique object of study:
namely, a set of lineages all claiming to represent Gurdjieff.
Secondly, utilising the broadest possible characterisation, the entire
set of doctrines and practices of these lineages emphasise awakening: it
presents a hierarchical cosmos of vast size, imbued with forces and
purposes which are incomprehensible to most people. And for a simple
reason: most people (and this includes thinkers/intellectuals) are asleep
and simply react like machines to external conditions. Subjectivity and
selthood are illusory, as each reaction is equated \vith a self. Indeed,
shocks must be administered to wake them all up. Only then can 'work
on oneself begin - the 'direct awareness' of other forces and energies
that move within them and around them on this planet - which is
essential if one is to wake up and fulfil the role for which this cosmos
has designed humanity.
Thirdly, in the pedagogical sense, this can only be accomplished
under the guidance of a teacher who is already awake; and even the
guidance of the teacher requires the existence of a 'school' if anything
substantial is to be accomplished. The fourth way~ the term the founding
'awakener' gave to the method of such schools, as opposed to the first
three ways of the yogi (mental), monk (emotional), or fakir (physical)
which require particular conditions, is the way of the person
encountering ordinary life and striving within it for a state of 'self-
remembrance' in which all three aspects participate and then engage in
those aforementioned forces and energies.
Finally, in terms of textual traditions, this study will take the writings
of both Gurdjieff and Ouspensky as paradigmatic and foundational,
especially Gurdjieffs Beelzebub's Tales to His Grandson and
Ouspensky's In Search of the Miraculous - as do the Fourth Way
lineages collectively. 1
The few episodic analytical (Le. academic) treatments of the teachings were
consulted (1. Webb, The Harmonious Circle. An exploration ofthe lives and work of
G.l GurdjiejJ, P.D. Ouspensky and others, London, 1980; M. Walberg, Gurdjieff:
An Approach to his Ideas, trans. Steven Cox, London, 1981; J. Gordon Melton,
Biographical Dictionary ofAmerican Cult and Sect Leaders, New York, 1986, p.
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The Faivrean 'empirical' definition ofesotericism.
Throughout his publications, Antoine Faivre, holder of the first chair for
the study of esotericism, has tentatively but consistently delineated a six-
point heuristic of esotericism. This asserts that firstly, the world, both
manifest and unmanifest, is a network of universal correspondences,
encompassing the terrestrial, the celestial, the supercelestial, the
scriptural and the transhistorical; and secondly, that nature is seen as a
multiple-tier, living organism, a tissue of sympathies and antipathies in
which humanity is profoundly imbricated.
Thirdly, imagination, as a creative as opposed to mundane faculty,
gives access to the various levels of reality, and functions through
images or symbols as mediations; and fourthly, a belief in, and desire
for, transmutation. The culminative and interlocking nature of the
antecedent characteristics 'catalyse' a soteriological and epistemological
rupture which both radically removes prior limited conditions while
simultaneously endowing a greatly expanded condition, to both
humanity and nature.
Fifthly, there is a praxis of concordance through which a superior
wisdom can be found by synthesising a variety of pre-existing traditions;
and finally, there is a dynamic of transmission by which teachings are
passed from one person to another, and traditions thereby established.!
103; J. Needleman, 'G. I. Gurdjieff and His School', in A. Faivre and 1. Needleman,
Modern Esoteric Spirituality, New York, 1992, pp. 359-380; A. Rawlinson, The
Book ofEnlightened Masters: Western Teachers in Eastern Traditions, Chicago and
La Salle, 1997, p. 27, 132; J. Oordon Melton, Encyclopedia ofAmerican Religions,
sixth edition, Detroit and London, 1999, p.179, pp. 864-865;0. Baker and W.
Driscoll, 'Gurdjieff in America: An Overview', in Timothy Miller (ed.), America's
Alternative Religions, AlbanY,1995, pp. 261-263) as well as a cursory and heuristic
examination of some of the polemic and voluminous apologetic.
A. Faivre, 'Esotericism', in M. Eliade (ed.), Encyclopedia ofReligion, Vol. 5, New
York, 1987; A. Faivre, 'Introduction 1', in A. Faivre and 1. Needleman, 1992, op.
cit., xv-xx; A. Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism, Albany, 1994; A. Faivre,
'Renaissance Hermeticism and the Concept of Western Esotericism', in R. van den
Broek and W. Hanegraaff(eds), Gnosis and Hermeticismfrom Antiquity to Modern
Times, Albany, 1998, pp. 119-122 (Faivre 1998a); A. Faivre, Theosophy,
Imagination, Tradition: Studies in Western Esotericism, Albany, 2000, pp. xxi-xxv,
and A. Faivre and K.-C. Voss, op. cit., pp. 60-64.
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According to Faivre, the first four are 'intrinsic' in that in so far as
they are mutually involved and interdependent they must be present for
the definition to apply. The other two are considered 'extrinsic' in that
they are not necessary to the function of the definition.
Faivre also emphasises that this is not a definition arrived at by
deduction but rather by induction, from the examination of particulars to
general principles: having studied certain historical traditions and their
textual products, he has found that certain characteristics are always
present, and that these may accordingly be used to define and demarcate
these traditions. In other words, it was an extrapolation from a number of
European post-Renaissance discourses which possessed a kind of air de
jami/le.l Moreover, this relationship had not previously existed, and
amounted to an interpenetration of discrete pre-existing traditions, ideas
and practices.2 This growing scholarly realisation of commensurabilities
and epistemological similarities between the various religious traditions
marginalised by both the predominant churched religious bodies and the
traditions of reason which lead to modem science, was made explicit by
Faivre and lead him to understand 'esotericism' historically as a modem
Western 'form of thought,' a 'style of imaginary', one among others, like
modem science, mysticism, theology, or utopia) This understanding
Faivre characterises as the 'empirical approach' of being 'anchored in
history', which has the advantages of facilitating the sketch of a possible
boundary around the field and to distance the scholar from the
ideological a priori ofthe esotericist which collapses differences.4
Mainly, the neo-Alexandrian Hermeticism and Christian Kabbalah which had its
beginnings in the Renaissance with the rediscovery of the Hermetica in 1463 and its
subsequent translation, and the development of Paracelsianism, the philosophia
occu[ta, Rosicrucianism and the theosophy of Boehme and his continuators in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
2 A. Faivre, 'Questions of Terminology Proper to the Study of Esoteric Currents in
Modem and Contemporary Europe', in R. van den Broek and W. Hanegraaff (eds),
Gnosis and Hermeticism from Antiquity to Modem Times, SUNY Press, Albany,
1998, (Faivre, 1998b), pp. 6-8.
3 In the sense that has recently acquired in the humanities, mostly in France,
'imaginary' refers to the images, symbols, myths, which consciously or not underlie
and/or permeate a discourse, a literary or artistic work, a current of thought, an
artistic or political trend; see Faivre, 1994, op. cit., p. 6.
4 Ibid., pp. 15-19.
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Hanegraa/fand Method.
Wouter J. Hanegraaff, who now holds the only other chair as well as
heading the only academic department dedicated to the study of western
esotericism, has offered the most sustained and decisive reflections upon
method and definition proper to the newly institutionalised field. As
such, they are largely concerned with defending and establishing
Faivre's empirical approach in opposition to either the religionist or the
reductionist approaches that have been presented as the only options
available to scholars who study religions, of which 'western esotericism'
is seen by Hanegraaff as a particular instantiation.1
His defence of Faivre's research program is theoretically reinforced
in two ways. Firstly, by the scholar of religions lan Platvoet's notion of
'methodological agnosticism' which rejects the axiomatically-held meta-
empirical claims of both religionist and reductionist scholars of religion
alike made about the 'multiple-tier cosmology' of the believer, a
worldview that encompasses an empirically perceptible and one or more
meta-empirical dimensions.2 That is, in studying religion, scholars are
dependent on believers expressing their awareness of a meta-empirical
reality in empirically perceptible ways, but qua scholars, they do not
themselves have direct access to the meta-empirical. While religionism
blurs the distinction, incorrectly claiming 'scientific' validity for non-
empirical knowledge, the reductionist is inevitably self-contradictory is
so far as falsification would require the meta-empirical to be empirical.
For this reason Platvoet argues that only the scholar who holds to a 'one-
tier cosmology' nonaxiomatically produces 'scientific' knowledge about
religion.
w. Hanegraaff, 'Empirical Method in the Study of Esotericism', Method and Theory
in the Study ofReligion, 1995, Vo!. 7, No. 2, pp. 99-129; Hanegraaff, 1996, op. cif.,
pp. 3-7, and W. Hanegraaff, 'On the Construction of "Esoteric Traditions''', in A.
Faivre and W. Hanegraaff (eds), 1998, op. cif., (Hanegraaff, 1998b) are
programmatic here.
2 1. Platvoet, 'The Definers Defined: Traditions in the Definition of Religion' , Method
and Theory in the Study of Religion, 1990, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 180-212; cf.,
Hanegraaff, 1995, op. cif., pp. 101-108; Hanegraaff, 1996, op. Cif., pp. 65-67; for a
balanced account of the 'sociology of the occult' position within the social sciences
as an example of reductionism in regard to esotericism, see Hanegraaff, 1995, op.
cif., pp. 119-120; Hanegraaff, 1998b, op. Cif., pp. 40-42.
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Platvoet also uses linguist Kenneth L. Pike's 'emicletic' distinction,
as mediated by anthropologist Marvin Harris.l In this case, the emic
refers to 'the believer's perspective'; it is essential to a valid study of
religions at all interested in taking its subject matter seriously. The
researcher spares no effort to represent this perspective as adequately as
possible. Such a representation is predicated upon on an attempt to
'bracket one's own biases'. The emic refers to any theoretical
perspective researchers may propose in order to 'make sense' of their
findings. On the one hand, then, empirical research of esotericism is etic
and should draw on methods of interpretation intrinsically not those of
the esotericist. On the other hand, in the emic stage, an unbiased
presentation of 'the believer's perspective' is the scholarly goal that
should motivate research.
Modification and Extension ofthe Faivrean Definition.
From this basis, Hanegraaff further argues that a continuing interplay of
emic material and etic interpretations is the indispensable foundation for
an empirical study of esotericism.2 In fact, he points out that Faivre's
definition entailed just such a dialectical, as opposed to an analytical,
procedure: 1) a pre-reflective intuition that, in spite of the extreme
variety, all of the phenomena nevertheless share some air de famille; 2)
the phenomena regarded as belonging to this class are studied; and 3) on
that inductive foundation, proposals are made to substantiate the
intuition by clarifying the empirical similarities in the form of theoretical
generalisations. This is also essentially what happens in empirical
definitions where 'religion' is seen as the class to which religions belong
simply because they share certain empirical similarities.3 Such
K. L. Pike, Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human
Behaviour, The Hague, 1967, pp. 38-39; M. Hams, Cultural Materialism: the
Struggle for the Science of Culture, New York, 1979, pp. 32-45; J. Platvoet,
Comparing Religions: a Limitative Approach. An Analysis ofAkan, Para-Creole and
IFO-Sananda Rites and Prayers, The Hague, 1982, pp. 4-5; cf., Hanegraaff 1995, op.
eit., p. 108; Hanegraaff, 1996, op. cit., pp. 4, 65-67; Hanegraaff 1998b, op. eit., pp.
12-15.
2 Hanegraaff, 1995, op. eit., p. 108; Hanegraaff, 1998b, op. cit., pp. 13, 45, n.11 O.
3 Hanegraaff, 1998b, op. cit., pp. 44-45. On the emergence of an intuitive sense of this
air defamille, see Faivre and Voss, op. cif., p. 49.
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operational definitions have the distinct advantage of falsifiabilty over
undertakings that assume an a priori essence, which ultimately reflect
the ideological preferences of its inventors.!
However, unlike 'religion', which is already a universalising
definition, 'western esotericism', although specifically demarcated as a
historical development of post-Renaissance western culture, can be used
to universalise the concept of 'esotericism' by applying it to other
discourses falling outside the scope of the original intuitively perceived
field. This leads to what Hanegraaff calls the 'interesting problem' of
scholars using the characteristics as a 'heuristic tool' in order to discover
'esotericism' in other religious (and perhaps even nonreligious)
contexts.2 Complicating matters further is the fact that Faivre himself
seems to leave open the possibility that esotericism existed before this
period, and thus, possibly, outside of the specific historical demarcation.3
It is in this light that we should interpret Hanegraffs modifications of
Faivre's definition.4 I also feel that it is safe to say that, as Hanegraaff
leaves himself out of his comprehensive and acute review of various etic
constructions of esotericism, it is his explicit narrative of an empirical
procedure vis-it-vis esotericism that is most representative of his own
position, and that we must also take this into account.S His attempt at a
comprehensive doctrinal analysis of New Age religiosity and his own
pre-reflective intuition that it shared an air de famille with previous
esoteric discourses, then, was without a doubt the catalyst for such
modifications.6
1 P. B. Clarke and P. Byme, Religion Defined and Explained, New York, 1993.
2 Hanegraaff, 1998b, op. cif., p. 46.
3 For just a few examples, see Faivre, 1994, op. cit., pp. 7, 56.
4 Hanegraaff, 1995, op. cif., pp. 111-113; Hanegraaff, 1996, op. cif., pp. 397-405;
Hanegraaff, 1998b, pp. 46-59; W. Hanegraaff, 'Some Remarks on the Study of
Western Esotericism', Theosophical History, Vol. 7, Vo. 6, 1999, pp. 223-226, 231
n. 21 (Hanegraaff 1999a).
5 Hanegraaff, 1998b, op. cit., pp.43-45; that he left out his own contribution to the
study of esotericism is strange but made explicable by his own culminative and
'dialectical' position within the newly institutionalised field.
6 Hanegraaff, 1996, op. cif., passim. This work, in particular, focusing as it does on
late modem religious traditions, must have been instrumental through its relevance in
justifying the study of western esotericism outside of a limited number of specialists.
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The problem Hanegraaff seemed to have with Faivre's defmition in
terms of possible empirical similarities is that no new developments of
the tradition can lead to the emergence of new characteristics, or, if they
do emerge, are only to be included as non-intrinsic elements.! Although
not essentialist, the definition was a 'theoretical generalization about
Christian traditions of a particular period'.2 Moreover, Faivre was
adamant that a 'universal esotericism' could not be established.3 In order
to overcome such localisation while avoiding essentialism, and perhaps
taking his cue from Faivre's own seeming inconsistencies, Hanegraaff
co-opted the scholar of gnosticism GiBes Quispel's fundamental
distinction between 'reason', 'faith' and 'gnosis', in which primacy is
accorded to personal experience over reason and faith. 4 However,
whereas Quispel saw these distinctions as particular instantiations of a
universal human nature, Hanegraaff took them to mean, in a more
limited ideal-typical sense, a tripartite typology of European cultural
tradition.5 That the central belief systems both of western esotericism
and of New Age religiosity share what might be called a 'holistic gnosis'
supports this.6
Yet it is also evident that the two do not share the same worldview.
Discontinuity somehow had to be accounted for. As Faivre categorised
esotericism as a 'form of thought', Hanegraaff was justifiably able to
make use here of the approach of historian of ideas Arthur o. Lovejoy in
order to formulate an 'empirical history of ideas' .7 The most important
1 Ibid., p. 401.
2 Hanegraaff, 1995, op. cit., p. 122; original italics.
3 Faivre, 1994, op. cit., p. 6.
4 G. Quispel (ed.), Gnosis: De derde component van de Europese cultuurtraditie,
Utrecht, 1988, p. 9.
5 W. Hanegraaff, 'A Dynamic Typological Approach to the Problem of "Post-
Gnostic" Gnosticism', ARIES, 1992, VD!. 16, pp. 5-43; Hanegraaff,1996, op. cit., pp.
517-521; Hanegraaff, 'Romanticism and the Esoteric Connection', in van den Broek
and Hanegraaff, op. cit., pp. 19-21 (Hanegraaff, 1998c).
6 W. Hanegraaff, 'The New Age Movement and the Esoteric Tradition', in van den
Broek and Hanegraaff, op. cit., p. 374 (Hanegraaff, 1998d).
7 A. Lovejoy, 'Reflections on the History of Ideas,' in D.R. Kelly, The History of
Ideas: Canon and Variation, Rochester, 1990, pp. 1-21; A. Lovejoy, The Great
Chain of Being, Massachusetts, 1964, pp. 3-23; and, in terms of application,
Lovejoy, 'The Meaning of Romanticism for the Historian of Ideas', Journal of the
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element of that approach was a 'temporalistic realism' which
emphasised 'that experience itself is temporal'. 1 From this notion of the
'genetic' in the history of ideas, Hanegraaff derived a diachronic
definition of esotericism as a 'form of thought' on historical-genetic
premises:
An esoteric tradition, on this foundation, may be defined as a
historical continuity in which individuals and/or groups are
demonstrably influence in their life and thinking by the esoteric ideas
fonnulated earlier, which they use and develop according to the
specific demands and cultural context of their own period.2
In tracing the filiation of ideas over time, and bearing in mind the
irreversibility of historical time, the intention must be to clarify 'the
complex ways in which people process - absorb, (re)interpret,
(re)construct, etc - the ideas of the past accessible to them', while
leaving 'room for relatively constant factors'.3 In the final analysis, a
'diachronic study of esotericism would have to consider any of its





History ofIdeas, 1941, Vo!. 2, pp. 257-278; er., Hanegraaff, 1995, op. cit., pp. 113-
117. On the history of ideas in general, see Kelly, 1990, op. cit. passim.
A. Lovejoy, lA Temporalistic Realism,' in G.P. Adams and W.P. Montague (eds),
Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements, Vol. 2, New York, 1962,
p. 87. Another is the still not widely recognised emphasis on non-logical factors in
the development of ideas, 'more or less unconscious mental habits' that are tacitly
presupposed rather than formally expressed and argued for - such as 'dialectical
motives' and diverse kinds of 'metaphysical pathos' like 'the etemalistic' and 'the
monistic' - in the dynamics of intellectual change, as opposed to only the logical
'pressure' of ideas whereby logical implications are drawn by inferences cf.,
Lovejoy, 1964, Opt cit., pp. 7-13. There is no reason to think. that this 'neo-
Lovejoyean' modification is incompatible with methodological agnosticism.
Hanegraaff, 1995, op. cif., pp. 117-118.
Ibid., p. 118. Such factors included by Hanegraaff are certain types of religious
experiences, certain inferences which are likely to be drawn from such experiences,
the 'logical pressure' of ideas and basic assumptions, and various pre-rational
factors proposed by Lovejoy. Nor does this mean that Hanegraaff suggests that the
study of esotericism should restrict itself to the study of ideas; cf., Ibid., p. 119.
Ibid., p. 121.
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Within this diachronic parameter, Hanegraaff demonstrates that a
pivotal watershed in the development of the post-Renaissance synthetic
traditions was reached under the broad impact of Enlightenment values
and the rise of mechanistic science.! These post-Enlightenment
developments of esotericism he collectively classed together as
'occultism', which reached its apogee in the period covering the second
half of the nineteenth century to the first decade of the nineteenth
century.2 Esotericists living in the post-Enlightenment period were
profoundly influenced by the new rationalism, positivism and scientism.
Brendan French has pointed out that the 'occultists' of this period - of
which Blavatsky, as the primary ideologue of the Theosophical Society,
can be seen as the zenith - self-consciously sought to usurp the rhetoric
and vocabulary of the scientific rationalist paradigms of their era, and
then wed them to traditionalist esoteric discourses, in an attempt to
redeem the world from 'the errancy of (Positivist) materialism'.3
Hanegraaff reached a similar generalisation:
Occultism, I suggest, can be defined as a category in the study of
religions, which comprises all attempts by esotericists to come to
terms with a disenchanted world, or, alternatively, by people in
general to make sense of esotericism from the perspective of a
disenchanted secular world.4
The result was a collision between two different and inherently
incompatible worldviews: the organicist worldview of esotericism based
on 'correspondences' and the post-Enlightenment worldviews based on
1 Hanegraaff, 1996, op. cit., p. 405.
2 Hanegraaff, 1998a, Ope cit., p. 375; for a detailed exposition of the period in question,
see J. Godwin, The Theosophical Enlightenment, SUNY Press, Albany, 1994. The
term 'occultism' emerged at the same time as 'esotericism'; for a brief history of the
term and the historical currents involved, see Faivre, 1994, Ope cit., pp. 33-34, 74-
77, 86-90; for more detailed exposition, see B. French, The Theosophical Masters.
An Investigation into the Conceptual Domains of H.P. Blavatsky and C. W.
Leadbeater, 2. vols (Ph.D. thesis), Sydney, 2000 passim.
3 French, 2000, op. cit., Vol. 1., xi-xii. For a 'macro-historical' perspective, see G.W.
Trompf, 'Macrohistory in Blavatsky, Steiner, and Guenon,' in Faivre and Hanegraaff,
1998, op. cit.
4 Hanegraaff, 1996, op. cit., p. 422; original italics.
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instrumental 'causality'.l Hanegraaff explained the rise of New Age
religiosity as a 'secularised' esotericism in terms of this incompatibility
and the differences between the largely nineteenth century occultism and
the occultism of the later decades of the twentieth century, particularly
the emergence of 'depth psychology' which largely solved this
incompatibility.2
Hanegraaffs contribution to the study of esotericism centers on
shifting the focus from Christian to para-Christian constructions. With
his diachronic modification of Faivre's definition, he arrived at post-
Christian esotericism, which emerges as Christianity ceases to be the
dominant symbolic idiom and becomes one of several in a culture
dominated by secularity.3
The Method Of Western Esotericism And The Contested Ground Of
Religious Studies
A cursory glance at even a few randomly chosen systematic treatments
subsequent to Faivre's empirical definition and Hanegraaffs later
dialectical modifications support my claim that they are seen as
consensually programatic and foundational; so much so that Faivre has





cf., Tambiah, op. cif., pp. 105-10.
Hanegraaff, 1995, op. cit., p. 121, n.45. Through depth psychology in particular and
Jung specifically, Romanticism and more specifically Romantic Nafurephilosophie
was the other major strand which formed one of the influences upon New Age
religion. Hanegraaff perceptively accounted for Romanticism as a reinterpretation of
esoteric cosmology, based on universal correspondences which were a legacy of
Renaissance Hermeticism, under the impact of the new evolutionism which changed
the nature of esotericism but left it with an internally consistent worldview; cf.,
Hanegraaf~ 1996, op. cif., pp. 406-407. However, it is difficult to believe that
secular esotericism have remained such pure 'types' on the ground, so to speak, as
we will be apparent in the case of Blavatsky later in this paper.
W. Hanegraaff, 'New Age Religion and Secularization', Numen, 2000, Vol. 47, no.
3, pp. 288-312.
D. Merkur, Gnosis: An Esoteric Tradition ofMystical Visions and Unions, Albany,
1993, p. ix (Faivre); 1. Snoek, 'On the Creation of Masonic Degrees: A Method and
its Fruits'. in Faivreand Hanegraaff 1998, op. cif., pp. 145-147; 1. Williams-Hogan,
'The Place of Emmanuel Swedenborg in Modem Western Esotericism', in Faivre
and Hanegraaff, 1998, op. cit., pp. 201-202 (Faivre); K-C. Voss, 'The University as
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base framework for generalisation, both Faivre and Hanegraaff have
from the outset positioned the study of western esotericism within the
field of religious studies.! An academic discipline, as religious studies is
taken to be, is 'characterised by the existence of general questions and
problem areas of a comparative or systematic nature'. Hanegraaff to this
effect advocates the development of 'interpretive theories pertaining to
various dimensions of western esotericism in general - or, at least large
and significant sub-areas of it'.2 This kind of scholarship, being written
in the growing sense of the boundaries of a field, has recapitulated, as we
have seen, the major methodological controversies of its construed
ancestral discipline, mainly the debate over reductionism as against
religionism, and sought to navigate a path between them through the
adoption of an empirical approach)
Yet, if we examine historiographically the emergence of the 'sciences
of religion' in the nineteenth century, the notion of empiricism as a
tertium quid which escapes dichotomous problematics also radicalised
the notion of 'religion' as an object of study in its own right.4 Moreover,
there is a growing awareness among contemporary scholars of religion -
the very body of knowledge practices and outcomes with which they are
a Space of Possibility', Recontres transdisciplinaires, 1998, Vol. 12; O. Hammer,
Claiming Knowledge. Strategies ofEpistemology from Theosophy to the New Age,
Brill, Leiden, 2001, pp. 6-8 (Faivre), 22, 48-49 n. 3, 51, 83, 507 (Hanegraaft)
(Hammer, 2001a); O. Hammer, review of 'Theosophy, Imagination, Tradition' by
Antoine Faivre, Theosophical History, 2001, Vol. 7, No. 7, p. 208 (Faivre)
(Hammer, 2001b). For Faivre's own redaction, see Faivre & Voss 1995, Ope cit., pp.
65~7; Faivre, 1998b, Ope cit., pp. 8-9.
Faivre, 1987, Ope cit., passim; Faivre, 1994, Ope cit., p. ix; Faivre, 2000, Ope cit., p.
xiii; Hanegraaff, 1995, Ope cit., 99-101; Hanegraaff, 1996, Ope cit., pp. 4-5.
However, with regard to Faivre, the positioning is less straightforward in that he
seems sometimes to be arguing for the 'transdisciplinary' status ofesotericism.
2 Hanegraaff, 1999, Ope cit., p. 227.
3 For the most recent instalment of this ongoing debate, see T.A. Indinopulos and E.A.
Yonan (eds), Religion and Reductionism: Essays on Eliade, Segal, and the
Challenge ofthe Social Sciences for the Study ofReligion, Brill, Leiden, 1994; for an
examination of the debate in terms of the discipline of western esotericism, see
Hanegraaff, 1995, Ope cit., pp. 99-108.
4 A.L. Molendjik, 'Introduction', in A.L. Molendjik and P. Pels, 1998, op. cit., p. 3. In
this case the dichotomy was between 'religion' as an instance of either superstition
or natural religion - precursors to contemporary to contemporary reductionism and
religionism.
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consciously aligning - that whether reductionist, religionist or empirical,
religious studies has remained unabashedly modernist in its self-
understanding and defmition. 1 This is despite the contrary and increasing
acknowledgment throughout the rest of the humanities and the social
sciences of the situated nature of human inquiry, previously occluded by
processes of abstraction, universalisation and their propagation that are
the hallmark of 'modernity' and which ipso facto structures scholarly
activity.2
The phenomenology ofreligion and the empirical
study ofwestern esotericism.
While Hanegraaff is aware that it is precisely this 'broadly "postmodem"
Zeitgeist, instinctively critical of the "grand narratives" of modernity and
therefore sympathetic towards the recovery of "suppressed alterities'"
which has created the academic milieu for the study of esotericism, this
appears at odds with the seemingly uncritical advocacy of an
unproblematic empiricism in the study of esotericism.3 What I will
attempt, then, in this section is to problematise the empirical approach as
a method for the study of esotericism by repositioning it within the ambit




M. Joy, 'Beyond a God's Eyeview: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of
Religion,' in A.W. Geertz and R.T. McCutcheon (eds), Perspectives on Method and
Theory in the Study ofReligion. Adjunct Proceedings of the XVIIth Congress of the
International Association for the History of Religions, Mexico City, 1995, Leiden,
2000, p. 117.
C. Bell, 'Modernism and Postmodernism in the Study of Religion', Religious Studies
Review, 1998, vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 17, p. 187 and passim. On the recontextualisation
of this production, see B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine
Porter, Massachusetts, 1993; for a comprehensive look at both the henneneutical
problems entailed and possible resolutions, see R.I. Bemstein, Beyond Objectivism
and Relativism. Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis, Philadelphia, 1983. For
discussion about the meaning of 'postmodemity' within the social sciences, see P.
Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences. Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions,
Princeton, 1991.
Hanegraaff, 1999a, op. cif., p. 228.
In comparison to other fields, the literature with which I have engaged is still sparse.
The most representative anthologies are M.C. Taylor (ed.), Critical Terms for
Religious Studies, Chicago, 1998; and 1. Platvoet and A.L. Molendjik (eds), The
Pragmatics of Defining Religion. Contexts, Concepts, and Contests, Brill, Leiden,
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As we have seen, both epoche and the notion of methodological
agnosticism which are the basis of this approach are explicitly used by
Hanegraaff and implicitly endorsed by Faivre.1 The notion of
'methodological agnosticism', as well as the commensurable notion of
epoche, or 'bracketing one's conceptions', have a distinguished pedigree
in the twentieth century study of religion as a prelude to the emic phase
of research. The more primitive term epoche was originally a central
platform of the phenomenological tradition of continental philosophy
that began formally with Husserl. This was later appropriated by a
number of scholars who sought to create a rigorous 'phenomenological'
method for the study of religion, what has come to be known as the
'phenomenology of religion'.2 Later, and more influentially, scholar of
1999. For individual monographs, see T. Asad, Genealogies ofReligion. Discipline
and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, Baltimore, 1993; R.T.
McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion. The Discourse of Sui Generis Religion and
the Politics of Nostalgia, Oxford, 1997; G. Flood, Beyond Phenomenology.
Rethinking the Study of Religion, London, 1999; and R. King, Orientalism and
Religion. Postcolonial Theory, India and 'The Mystic East', London, 1999. For a
good but brief introduction, see W. Braun and R.T. McCutcheon (eds), Guide to the
Study of Religion, London, 2000. Such 'critical' scholarship is not historically
unprecedented; figures such as Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Jonathan Z. Smith and
Donald Wiebe are obvious candidates for progenitors of the movement; cf., W.C.
Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, A New Approach to the Religious
Traditions of Mankind, New York, 1962; lZ. Smith, Imagining Religion. From
Babylon to Jonestown, Chicago, 1982; and D. Wiebe, The Politics of Religious
Studies: the Continuing Conflict with Theology in the Academy, New York, 1998.
1 Hanegraaff, 1996, op. cit., p. 4; and Hanegraaff, 1998b, op. cit., p. 61.
2 For an anthologised introduction to the vast literature on the 'phenomenology of
religion', see S.B. Twiss and W.H. Cosner, Jr. (eds), Experience of the Sacred.
Readings in the Phenomenology ofReligion, Hanover, 1992. Many germinal scholars
of religion have been construed as 'phenomenologists', such as van der Leeuw,
Scheler and most infamously the 'straw man' of the field, Eliade; for pre-1950s
figures, see 1. Waardenburg, Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion. Aims,
Methods and Theories of Research, Berlin, 1999, pp. 639-664, and U. King,
'Historical and Phenomenological Approaches,' in F. Whaling (ed.), Theory and
Method in Religious Studies. Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Religions,
Berlin, 1995 for the post-1950s developments. However, while outside the scope of
this study, there is some real historical and conceptual confusion as to actual
phenomenological sources of this appropriation; on this matter, see W.H. Capps,
Religious Studies. The Making ofa Discipline, Minneapolis, 1995, pp. 110-128 and
T. Ryba, The Essence ofPhenomenology and Its Meaning for the Scientific Study of
Religion, New York, 1991 passim.
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religion Ninian Smart translated epoche into the terminology of the
antipathetic social sciences as 'methodological agnosticism', or the
suspension of truth questions concerning the focus of religion, allowing
for the development of typologies in lieu of an explanatory mode!.l 2
It is upon this foundation of 'empirico-historical description of
narrowly-circumscribed currents and personalities' that Hanegraaff has
recently argued for the pursuit of a 'methodological pluralism' which
will change the already established 'field' into a 'discipline' through the
development of competing and complementary 'interpretive theories
pertaining to ... western esotericism "as such"'.3 This new shift in
emphasis, then, is the culmination rather than a rupture with the
empirical approach, mainly in response to the plethora of theoretical and
interpretive frameworks in the wake of the aforementioned 'postmodem
turn'. Indeed, some of their less systematic applications to western
esotericism Hanegraaff has acknowledged as producing 'interesting




For example, cf., N. Smart, The Science o/Religion and the Sociology o/Knowledge.
Some Methodological Questions, Princeton, 1973, pp. 53-54. I suspect that Smart's
paradigmatic use of epoche and the resulting typologies had at least an indirect
influence on Hanegraaff; cf., Hanegraaff, 1995, op. cit., p. 118.
Given the importance of Husserl in religious studies methodology, there has been
little continued discussion of him and, surprisingly, no development of the
phenomenological method since its adaptation. However, outside of religious studies
things have moved on considerably and the phenomenological tradition has offered
critiques of Husserlian method and has set out in new directions, some of which
engage with the wider cultural movement of postmodemism; cJ., Flood, 1999, op.
cit., p. 16. It is interesting to note that the at least three paths of critical development
that can be traced from Husserl have had little influence on the phenomenology in
the study of religions: first, the central tradition of philosophical phenomenology
represented in the work of the phenomenological circle (Edith Stein, Adolf Reinach
and others) through to the French phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty and Gabriel
Marcel, along with the theological phenomenology of Max Scheler; secondly, a path
of existential phenomenology in Heidegger which leads into the hermeneutics of
Gadamer on the one hand, and the existentialism of Sartre and de Beauvoir on the
other; and thirdly a sociological phenomenology in the work of Moritz Geiger and
especially Alfred Schutz, which draws on Weberian sociological and develops into
ethnomethodology.
Hanegraaff, 1999, op. cif., pp. 226-227.
Among those mentioned are T.M. Luhrmann, Persuasions 0/ the Witch's Craft:
Ritual Magic in Contemporary England, Massachusetts, 1989; G. Tomlinson, Music
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existence of a subjective element in research in the humanities must
thus be recognised ... this recognition should not be misused as a
pretext to abandon the ideal of objectivity altogether ... [otherwise it]
produces a pseudo-scientific enterprise which allows its
representatives to abandon any attempt to understand 'othemess'.l
The transcendentalist implications of the phenomenological project in
the study ojreligions.
However, as Hans Penner has observed, phenomenology in the study of
religions is not simply a 'neutral method or pure description of
phenomena' but is a 'transcendental philosophy'.2 As long as the
modernist 'ideal of objectivity' is upheld, any claim of 'methodological
pluralism' will lack substance, for many of these theoretical and
interpretive frameworks now question such an investment. It is possible,
though, to delineate two broad groups into which these frameworks
divide and this may render Hanegraaffs problematic defence of
objectivity intelligible. As Gavin Flood has pointed out, in response to
structuralism, two currents have developed: 'postmodem
deconstruction', a hypercritical account of modernism, suspicious of all
claims to certainty and knowledge which tends to read knowledge as
power; and 'dialogism' with its links to hermeneutics and narrativism,
which is suspicious of claims to objectivity and truth, but is
fundamentally grounded in communication and acknowledges self-in-
relation.3 This distinction is not often made, and has led in this case to an
unnecessary elision.4
in Renaissance Magic. Toward a Historiography of Others, Chicago, 1993; and
Merkur, 1993, op. cit.; cf., Hanegraaff, 1999, op. cit., p. 231, n. 20.
Hanegraaff, 1998b, op. cit., p. 16; contra G. D'Costa, 'The End of "Theology" and
"Religious Studies"', Theology, 1996, September/October, p. 345.
2 H. Penner, Impasse and Resolution: A Critique of the Study ofReligion, New York,
1989, p. 44.
3 Flood, 1999, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
4 For example, useful distinctions have been made between 'skeptical' and
'affirmative' postmodemism, and between 'fragmentary' and 'relational'
subjectivity, and thus to the reappraisal of postmodem frameworks in the social
sciences; cf., Rosenau, op. cit. passim and King, 1999, op. cit., p. 198 respectively.
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Recently, Flood, engaging with this dialogical current, has sought to
further demonstrate the transcendentalist underpinnings of religious
studies, and it is to this demonstration I now turn; of course, I can only
here provide a brief synopsis. 1 In brief, Flood argues that the
phenomenology of religion which advocates a method of bracketing the
ultimate status of research data, the creation of typologies, and empathy,
inevitably brings with it Husserl's idea of a disembodied, disengaged
and ahistorical consciousness or epistemic subject who has privileged
access to knowledge.2 It is from Russerl that this assumption of a
transcendental 'I' as the absolute ground of certainty enters the
phenomenology of religion. This 'philosophy of consciousness' entailed
by the phenomenological method Flood critiques from the perspective of
the 'philosophy of the sign' as presented by Ricoeur and Bakhtin, in
which the self is represented as a sign-bearing agent embodied within
social and historical contexts, within narratives, rather than a disengaged
consciousness. Communication and intersubjectivity takes precedence
over subjectivity as the basis of epistemology and analysis, and
interpretation takes precedence over ontology.3 This critique of
consciousness is a critique of the phenomenology ofreligion.4
Furthering Alterity: Gurdjieff And The Fourth Way As
Hertoglossia In The Study Of Western Esotericism
At this juncture, the reader is sufficiently versed in the issues involved
for a comparison of the heuristic definition of the Fourth Way with both
Faivre's procedural definition of western esotericism and Hanegraaffs
1 Flood, 1999, op. cit., passim.
2 Ibid., p. 14. Historically, phenomenological tradition which Husserl bequeathed was
a development of the German tradition of a philosophy of consciousness
(Subjektphilosophie). It can be traced back to Descartes, and beyond him to Greek
thought, but is especially developed within the German idealism of the late
Enlightenment and early Romanticism, particularly Fitche's foundational notion of
the 'I' as the absolute ground of knowledge. Kant, though critical, accepted as
axiomatic the presence of an intelligible, autonomous self, and both had a formative
influence on Russer!. cf., Flood, 1999, op. cit., p. 9.
3 Ibid., p. 11.
4 Ibid., p. 14 and M. Bakhtin, The Dialogical Imagination: Four Essays, Austin, 1981.
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observations regarding occultism as its modem development to be
relevant.
Faivre, imagination and the Fourth Way.
A comparison between Faivre's six-point procedural definition and my
heuristic definition of the Fourth Way, while a good fit on most counts,
encounters problems with the third characteristic, imagination and
mediation.
Firstly, as we have seen, given that somnambulism is the structure of
the unregenerate human condition in the Fourth Way, it is not a surprise
to discover that rather than being integral the goal of transformative
gnosis, imagination is seen by Gurdjieff and hence paradigmatically for
all of the Fourth Way lineages to be 'one of the principal sources of the
wrong work of the centers,' that is, the primary stumbling block to 'self-
remembrance'.1 If reality is to be apprehended, imagination is to be
disengaged. The Fourth Way, then, is closer to Faivre's characterisation
of mysticism, which aspires to complete suppression of images and
intermediaries as obstacles to union with God, as opposed to the esoteric
interest in intermediaries that revealed to the inner eye, through power of
creative imagination.2
Also, while, for Faivre, the 'idea of correspondence already
presupposes a form of imagination', it is clear that Gurdjieff and the
Fourth Way entertain a form of correspondence, particularly between the
microcosm and the macrocosm in the state of 'self-remembrance', which
is indispensable to awakening and yet does not engage in a discourse of
'imagination'.3 Williams-Hogan has encountered a related problem with
regard to Emmanuel Swedenborg and his ambiguous relationship to
western esotericism. In Swedenborg's case, she too found a good fit for
all the six-points of the definition except living nature, as from
Swedenborg's point of view, nature is not essentially alive in all its parts,
nor can it anticipate salvation.4
P. D. Ouspensky, In Search ofthe Miraculous, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1950, p. 111.
2 Faivre, 1994, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
3 Faivre, 1992, op. cit., p. xvii.
4 Williams-Hogan, 1998, op. cit., p. 222.
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Hanegraaff, occultism and the Fourth Way.
For Hanegraaff, this incongruity was resolved with his emphasis on
occultism as the reinterpretation of these constituent elements between
generations and networks of esotericists: that 'a combined Cartesian and
Christian dualism... forms the cosmological framework of
Swedenborg"s doctrine of correspondences' and that the 'frameworks he
inherited from esoteric traditions were changed by him into something
new'.I It would seem natural to seek a resolution to the problem of
imagination in the Fourth Way through its application.
Central to Gurdjieffs teaching is the idea of cosmic law: in his own
characteristic syntax, 'the conscious striving to know ever more and
more concerning the laws of World-creation and World-maintenance' is
the 'being-obligation' of every human being.2 Like Blavatsky's
synthesis, Gurdjieff's notion of a universal law seems based not on
correspondences but on causality, highly characteristic of the occultist
rather than the earlier esotericisms from which Faivre's defmition
originates. Law is inescapable and has different cosmological orders
which compound upon the levels beneath them, which is reflected in the
'Ray of Creation' , a pivotal idea in the Fourth Way to which we can only
allude here.3 There are two 'fundamental cosmic sacred laws'.4 The first
Gurdjieffterms Heptaparaparshinokh, 'the Law of Sevenfoldness, , or as
he described it Ouspensky, 'The Law of Octaves'.5 Gurdjieff quite
simply defines this law as 'the-line-of-the-flow-of-forces-constantly-
deflecting-according-to-Iaw-and-uniting-again-as-it-ends.'6
The 'second fundamental cosmic law', Triamazikamno or 'the Law
of Three' according to Gurdjieff 'manifests in everything, without
exception, and everywhere in the Universe ... a law which always flows
into a consequence and becomes the cause of subsequent consequences,
1 Hanegraaff, 1996, op. cif., pp. 428-429.
2 G. I. Gurdjieff, Beelzebub 's Tales to his Grandson, 1950, p. 386.
3 For a description and an allusion to its importance, see Ouspensky, 1950, op. cU., pp.
82-86, 137-140.
4 Gurdjieff, 1950, op. cit., p. 755.
5 Ibid., p. 461; Ouspensky, 1950, op. cit., pp. 124-137.
6 Ibid., p. 750.
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and always functions by three independent and quite opposite
characteristic manifestations, latent within it, in properties neither seen
nor sensed~, named 'Holy Affirming', 'Holy Denying" and 'Holy
Reconciling'.1 These laws are also present in the human constitution and
are the basis of self-study in the Fourth Way; hence, a definite
connection between causality and correspondence through the
equivalence of the microcosm with the macrocosm.
Hanegraaff and French have convincingly demonstrated that
Blavatksy's fundamental belief system was an occultist version of
romantic evolutionism from beginning to end.2 However, rather than
being concerned with evolutionism opposed to materialism, Gurdjieffs
paradigmatic formulation of the Fourth Way seems engaged with the
more contemporaneous rupturing in the Newtonian physical model. For
example, Gurdjieff spoke of the total 'materiality of the universe' and
the different levels of materiality which ran parallel to the different
orders of cosmic laws. The matter that we knew was only one such lower
order.3 He made use of an analogous 'principle of relativity' in relation
to the notion of materiality.4 Even 'the Absolute, where all is one', was
characterised by Gurdjieff (to Ouspensky) as the unity of 'matter and
force'.5 Blavatsky instead talked of a karma which was assimilated
within an already-existing western framework of spiritual progress and
was adopted in order to provide her evolutionism with a theory of
'scientific' causality.6
Indeed, Gurdjieff is' highly critical of Blavatsky and the occultistic
version of romantic evolutionism prior to his teaching. He claims that
neither 'theosophy' nor 'so-called Western occultism ... possesses full
1 Ibid., pp. 138-139.
2 Hanegraaff, 1996, op. cit., pp. 448-455 and French, 2000, op. cit., passim.
3 Ouspensky 1950, op. cit., p. 86.
4 Ibid., pp. 207-208.
5 Ibid., p. 86.
6 Hanegraaff, 1996, op. cit., p. 472. It is not the case that she abandoned western
beliefs in favour oforiental ones; what was derived from Hinduism and Buddhism is
not reincarnation, but the idea of an impersonal 'causal law' which could serve as a
'scientific' alternative to Christian morality; cf., Hanegraaff, 1996, Opt cif., p. 480.
How this relates to the analogous issue of Gurdjieffs relationship to Sufism, imputed
to him by apologists, polemicists and researchers alike, is a question worth
exploring.
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knowledge and therefore attempts to bring them to practical realization
give only negative results' - a claim, interestingly enough, which echoes
Blavatsky's criticisms of spiritualism.l Evolution was presented as the
great Law of Nature, which governs the natural as well as the
supernatural levels of existence. Accordingly, the eighteenth century
theory of spiritual evolution through many lives in this world, on other
planets, and in higher worlds - seen, for example, in Swedenborg - was
adopted by Blavatsky, but it was reconceptualised by her as based on
Natural Law rather than divine providence.2 Similarly, Gurdjieff is
critical of such spiritual evolution:
the systems with which you are acquainted with [Le. Theosophy and
occultism] ... state that all men have an 'astral body.' This is quite
wrong. What may be called the 'astral body' is obtained by means of
fusion, that is, by means of terribly hard inner work and struggle.
Man is not born with it. And only very few men acquire an 'astral
body.' ... it is not immortal but it can live long after the death of the
physical body.3
In this way, Gurdjieff (to Ouspensky) acknowledges reincarnation as a
post-mortem possibility but 'the development of these possibilities is not
a law. The law for man is existence in the circle of mechanical
influences, the state of "man-machine'''.4 Moreover, '[k]nowledge about
the repetition of lives will add nothing for a man if he does not see how
everything repeats itself in one life, that is, in this life, and if he does not
strive to change himself in order to escape this'.5 Later Gurdjieff himself
was to write that 'they suppose among other things that each of them
already has a higher-being part or, as they call it, a soul, and that
transmigration must be occurring all the time to this soul', with the
Ouspensky, 1950, Ope cif., p. 286. On Blavatsky's criticisms of spiritualism see
Godwin, 1994, Ope cif., pp. 281-282, and French, 2000, Ope cif., pp. 85-92. French's
further and in-depth analysis of occultism has informed this paper throughout.
2 Hanegraaff, 1996, Ope cif., p. 480.
3 Ouspensky, 1950, Ope cit., p. 32.
4 Ibid., p. 47.
5 Ibid., pp. 250-251.
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implication that what he calls 'higher-being bodies' are not at all
common, can only be attained.l
In a similar vein, the notion of chakras or a system of 'subtle bodies'
in contemporary post-theosophical esotericism, appropriated from India
and now companion-idea to the older occultistic astral body, is
ubiquitous.2 Basic to the chakra system is the evolutionary,. seminal and
energising function of the kundalini chakra at the base of the spine, and
it rose to prominence in occult circles in the late nineteenth century. Yet,
for Gurdjieff, '[i]n reality Kundalini is the power of imagination, the
power of fantasy, which takes the place ofa real function ... [it] is the
force put into men in order to keep them in their present state ... [it] is
the force that keeps them in a hypnotised state. "To awaken" for man
means to be "dehypnotized'''.3 It was to make a reappearance within
Gurdjieffs later cosmology as the 'organ Kundabuffer' .4
Naturephilosophie - Faivre revisited.
Although absent from Hanegraaffs analysis of occultism, Faivre, in his
most comprehensive historical overview, has made an attempt to include
both Gurdjieff and Ouspensky as 'esotericists who take on the task of
building a Naturephilosopie'.5 Faivre claims that Gurdjieffs teachings,
in particular, are 'among the most representative of a Naturephilosophie'
in twentieth century esotericism, though in Ouspensky's own exposition
of the Fourth Way he finds a more 'complete teaching of
Naturephilosophie'.6 This would seem, on the face of it, to support my
intuitive sense of the Fo'urth Way as sharing some air de famille with
western esotericism.
Once again, the fit is not exact. Faivre has characterised
Naturephilosophie as a Romantic - and particularly German Romantic -
innovation of earlier theosophical and alchemical traditions with 'a view
1 Gurdjieff, 1950, op. cit., p. 767.
2 Hammer, 2001 a, op. cit., pp. 91-97, 181-198.
3 Ouspensky, 1950, op. cif., p. 220.
4 Gurdjieff, 1950, op. cit., pp. 88, 233, 374.
5 Faivre, 1994, op. cif., p. 99.
6 Ibid., p. 100.
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to proposing a vision of the world resting on scientific foundations'. 1
This functioned as a 'point of departure for an inclusive grasp of
invisible processes' in which knowledge of Nature, identified with
Spirit, and knowledge of oneselfwent 'hand in hand'.2
In as much as the presence of an active and intelligent Great Nature is
important to Gurdjieffs overall cosmology, so far so good.3 The
problem this time arises with Faivre's further characterisation of
Naturephilosophie as 'the attempt to grasp the whole animated by
dynamic polarities' as oppositional to 'a mechanist imaginary'.4 Not
only does this imaginary, as we have seen, structure Gurdjieff's vision,
but as a consequence of this opposition Faivre characterises that vision
of Nature as dualistic, which does not accord with the primacy that
Gurdjieff as well as Ouspensky regard the 'Law of Three'. Another
problem involves the difference between Gurdjieffs later cosmology
and the cosmology he earlier presented to his pre-Revolutionary Russian
group, documented by Ouspensky, where the 'way of development of
hidden possibilities is a way against nature, against God' .5
Gnosis, para-Christian esotericism and the Fourth Way.
As Hanegraaff has made clear, all unifying conceptions of western
esotericism emphasising certain commonalities and continuities, and de-
emphasising differences and discontinuities, what Faivre has referred to
as an air de famille. 6 Whether implicitly or explicitly, both consider
some notion of 'gnosis' to be the broadest commonality.7 'Gnosis' in
this sense is only indirectly concerned with the historical 'Gnosticisms'
of the first few centuries of the Common Era.8 It refers, rather, to a
1 Ibid., p. 99.
2 Ibid., p. 82.
3 Gurdjieff, 1950, op. cit., pp. 106, 146, 327-328.
4 Faivre, 1994, op. cit., p. 82.
5 Ouspensky, 1950, op. cit., p. 47; original italics.
6 Hanegraaft: 1998b, op. cit., p. 15.
7 cf., Faivre, 1994, op. cit., pp. 11, 276.
8 However, even the validity of the category 'Gnosticism' has been challenged for its
monolithic presentation of diverse religious traditions; cf., M.A. Williams
R~thinking 'Gnosticism ': An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category:
Pnnceton, 1996.
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diachronic phenomenon of religious soteriological epistemology, but
with which it does bear a certain conceptual resemblance, that is, an
emphasis on personal, inner revelation, in contrast with the knowledge of
reason or faith.l
As we have seen, Hanegraaff's concern with a diachronic
modification of Faivre's definition lead to the notion of post-Christian
and ipso facto para-Christian esotericism. In this vein, entertaining the
possibility of esotericism as a domain of the scriptural traditions -
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam - he also tentatively posits an extra-
Christian esotericism in two senses: 1) considering the coexistence of
these traditions for long periods in roughly the same geographical area, it
is possible that esoteric traditions within the domain as a whole may be
explained by genetic diffusion based on inter-religious contact; and 2)
the possibility of (relatively) independent invention, based not on a
universal mysticism but on the 'logic(s) of monotheism and
scripturalism' .2
The study of 'esotericism', then, may have to be regarded as part of a
larger, more complicated domain including 'esotericism', 'gnosticism',
and 'mysticism' so-called, but in which they function more as ideal-
typical distinctions.3 To this effect, Dan has suggested that it is of minor
importance whether one chooses 'mysticism' or 'esotericism' as a
generic tenn, and adds that 'the modem study of gnosticism almost
completely neglects the aspect of gnosticism as mysticism' .4
This possibility of extra-Christian esotericism has many implications
for the transgressive status of Gurdjieff and the Fourth Way within the
categories of western esotericism and occultism. The roots of Gurdjieffs
doctrines and practices have been variously associated with Kabbalah,
Hermeticism, the Sufi tariqas of both Turkey and Central Asia, the
Isma' Hi branch of Shi'a Islam, and the hesychasm of both the Greek and
Russian Orthodox Churches - leaving aside for the moment his own
1 Hanegraaff, 1992, op. cit., p. 10.
2 Thereby combining the 'contingent' approach of the scholars of Jewish mysticism
Gershom Scholem and Joesph Dan to mysticism as a 'tradition of commentary on
scripture' with that of his (neo)Lovejoyean modification of Faivre; cf., Hanegraaff,
1995,op. cif., pp. 122-124; Hanegraaff, 1998b,op. cit., pp. 50-54, 59.
3 Hanegraaff, 1995, op. cif., pp. 122-123.
4 J. Dan, 'In Quest of a Historical Definition of Mysticism: The Contingental
Approach', Studies in Spirituality, 1993, Vo!' 3, pp. 62-64.
112
Gurdjieffand the Fourth Way
claim to be a messenger or initiate of the 'Sarmoung' or 'World
Brotherhood'. I His own autobiographical claims of extensive travel
throughout the Middle East and Central Asia prior to 1912 would make
an exploration of the first sense relevant. However, considering that we
have thus far no independent means to verify Gurdjieffs claims, I will
pass this sense by without comment, except to note the inevitable
Orientalist problematic of cultural (mis)appropriation with this
possibility.
It is with regard to the second sense of an extra-Christian domain
encompassing gnosticisms, mysticisms and esotericisms structured by
the 'logic(s) of monotheism andscripturalism' that we will be on safer
ground for the time being. It is clear that in Gurdjieffs own writings,
such logics are present, particularly in the form of resemblances to
certain strands of gnosticism such as Valentinianism.2 For example, as
one commentator on Beelzebu's Tales to His Grandson has pointed out,
Gurdj ieff presents throughout not an utterly perfect God-creator but an
unknowable, material 'Absolute' whose power becomes gradually
2
On Kabbalah and Hermeticism, see the speculative links made in Webb, 1980, op.
cit., pp. 499-542. Melton has advocated the classification of the Fourth Way as
'refurbished Sufism'; et:, Melton, 1986, op. cit., pp. 103-104; Melton, 1999, op. cit.,
pp. 179, 864-865; and also by Baker and Driscoll, 1995, op. cit. For more on the
tariqas of which 'Sufism' in the abstract is historically comprised, see 1.S.
Trimingham, The Sufi Orders ofIslam, Oxford, 1973. On Isma'ili Shi'ism, see P.K.
JoOOson, Initiates of Theosophical Masters, SUNY Press, Albany, 1995, pp. 149-
150. On the influence of hesychasm and the idea of the Fourth Way as 'esoteric
Christianity', see R. Amis, A Different Christianity. Early Christian esotericism and
Modern Thought, SUNY Press, Albany, 1995, esp. pp. 347-348; and for a brief
classic account of hesychsam, see V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern
Church, London, 1957, pp. 196-216. We must also leave aside his possible
historical relationship to Blavatsky's synthesis of occultism, his apparent sojourn in
Tibet, and the similarities between his cosmology and that of 19th century American
occultist Randolph Beverley Pascal who also claimed to have travelled in the Middle
East.
On Valentinianism, see H. Jonas, The Gnostic Religion. The Message of the Alien
God and the Beginnings of Christianity, Boston, 1963, pp. 174-206. On historical
Gnosticism, the best general work is still K. Rudolph, Gnosis. The Nature and
History ofan Ancient Religion, trans. Robert McLachlan Wilson, Edinburgh, 1983.
On the different though related issue of the recurrence of gnostic narrativities in the
structuring of modernity, see C. O'Regan, Gnostic Return in Modernity, SUNY
Press, Albany, 2001.
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diminished in an elaborate cosmology of inevitable diffusion of energy.
For Gurdjieff, God seems to be imperfect inasmuch as he is not entirely
in control of creation; on the other hand, it is this preconditioned
limitation that facilitates the processes of creation. This process still
serves 'Nature' but something went wrong with the situation of the
people of this planet, which as a consequence is in a very bad part of the
universe. l
Indeed, Gurdjieff pictures much of creation, including our situation,
as the responsibility of the 'higher' beings or 'Sacred Cosmic
Individuals' who form an angelogical hierarchy; and that the creation of
the 'organ Kundabuffer' which keeps humanity from awakening is a
direct result of their attempt to correct that mistake due to their
fallibility. In this way, fallibility is equated with evil, caused by a
gradual increasing density of matter as it proceeds downward from the
Absolute. As there are two movements in the universe - one downward
from the Absolute, the other is upward and toward it - there is a means
ofescape.2
Where Gurdjieffs notion of escape differs to the historically known
gnosticisms is with regard to the modem idea of causality, whereby
mechanism and determinism also increases along with the density of
matter and the diffusion of energy: 'General laws are by no means
obligatory for man; he can free himself from any of them if he frees
himself from "buffers" and from imagination'.3 I feel that we can go
some way in clarifying the sense of air de famille - and bearing in mind
the idea of para-Christian esotericism - by further categorising the
Fourth Way, within the rubric of western esotericism, as a species of
gnostic occultism. That Gurdjieff claimed to have spent much of his
unverifiable years in Central Asia, long a hotbed for the propagation of
'gnostic' doctrines and practices, makes this characterisation very
suggestive.4
M. Seymour-Smith, The 100 Most Influential Books Ever Written. The History of
Thoughtfrom Ancient Times to Today, Toronto, 1998, p. 452.
2 Ibid., p. 119.
3 Ouspensky, 1950, op. cit., p. 165.
4 For brief introduction to Central Asia from this perspective, see R.C. Foltz, Religions
of the Silk Road. Overland Trade and Cultural Exchange from Antiquity to the
Fifteenth Century, New York, 1999; and U. Stoyanov, The Other God. Dualist
Religionfrom Antiquity to the Cathar Heresy, New York, 2000.
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Transcendentalism, esotericism, and heteroglossia.
Faivre has contended that 'imagination ... is a tool for the knowledge of
the self, and many traditions that fall into the category of western
esotericism exemplify this.! Imagination does not play this 'gnostic' role
in the Fourth Way for a very simple reason: Gurdjieff and the subsequent
Fourth Way lineages do not allow the possibility of a unified subject in
'hypnotized' humanity: 'Man has no permanent and unchangeable I ...
Man has no individuality. He has no single, big I. Man is divided into a
multiplicity of small "1's"'.2 Indeed, as we have seen, post-mortem
existence is predicated upon such an acquisition of greater and greater
subjective unity. It is these "'I's" [that] must die in order that the big I be
born'. The complete identification of all the energy diffused to us
through the processes of creation with each 'I' prevents the growth of the
'higher-being-bodies'. Gurdjieff claims that imagination, in particular,
encourages such identifications.3
Faivre's misreading of the Fourth Way, as well as Hanegraaffs and
subsequent researchers' unfamiliarity with the tradition, I believe stems
from the phenomenology of religion's and therefore the empirical
method's assumption of an ahistorical unified subject - what Husserl
called the transcendental ego - dwelling behind experience, both of the
researcher and the object of study; an assumption brought into question
by Flood.4 While 'gnosis' has been characterised as an inner,
transformative and personal 'religious experience', an examination of
Fourth Way doctrines and practices demonstrates that a 'soteriological
epistemology' does not necessarily coincide with a unified subject.5
Flood notes that the practice of a 'conversation' with our subject that
takes into account the situated nature of inquiry gives rise to a context-
1 Faivre, 1992, op. cit., p. xvii.
2 Ouspensky, 1950, op. cit., pp. 59-61.
3 Ibid., p. 218.
4 Flood, 1999, Ope cit., p. 105.
5 Faivre, 1994, op. cit., pp. 10-11, 11-12. Buddhism, too, particularly the
Madhyamika school of Mahayana Buddhism, can be said to display a similar
configuration but from within an 'non-theistic' context; cf., C.W. Huntington, Jr.,
The Emptiness of Emptiness. An Introduction to Early Indian Madhyamika,
Honolulu, 1989.
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sensitive discourse and writing, and entails the recognition of the 'many
voices' with which subjects speak. Bakhtin called this heteroglossia: the
presence in language of different (dominant and subservient, open and
hidden, official and unofficial) discourses, as well as the trace of other
utterances within any single utterance. l In this case, the basis upon
which a number of religious discourses were classified was itself a
hidden though dominant discourse, which has rendered at least one other
discourse invisible to all intents and purposes. The unique features of
many esotericisms have most likely fallen through the net in this way, as
Hanegraaff himself has already demonstrated; indeed, esotericisms as
cognitive spaces composed of networks of correspondences and
interdependencies are perhaps best rendered by theoretical frameworks
equally processuaL Hanegraaff has gone to great lengths to expose the
role of motivation in the construction of esotericism.2 However, there is
a danger of occluding disciplinarity with a new hegemony and
marginalisation to the detriment of cultural understanding, regardless of
intention. Flood argues that this recognition of the intentionality of
method needs to be further understood as a dialogical process with the
intentionality of its object.3 For the study of the Fourth Way, this means
recognizing at the very least that a method which assumes a unified self
as a given will find it difficult to analyse a discourse where one can only
be acquired and that rarely.
Notes Towards A 'Critical' Study Of Western Esotericism: Beyond
The Ideal Of Objectivity
This study will conclude with a few observations with regard to the
problems inherent in the dialectical asymmetry between the emic and
etic perspectives.
If we are to take the situated nature of inquiry seriously, then instead
of the notional value-free discourse and its ontological isolated
consciousness which is the claim of phenomenology, we must
acknowledge competing narratives and critiques stemming from those
1 Flood, 1999, op. cit., p. 35.
2 Ibid., p. 17.
3 Ibid., p. 37.
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narratives, which indicate that all representations of the world are
historically and linguistically mediated. While they have functioned to
liberate the study of religions from theological dogmatism, these
concepts now unnecessarily limit the range of methodological
possibilities within the study of religions. l The cultural representations
we call 'religions' are as much the products of signifying practices
within a diversity of social contexts as are the practices which study
those representations.2 As Flood has observed, 'there are no truly
"outsider" views but only "insider" ones' .3
What becomes important in the study of religions is not so much the
distinction between insider and outsider but between the critical and noo-
critica1.4 To this end, with the growing acknowledgment of situatedness,
contemporary scholarship on religions is also acknowledging the
situatedness of 'methodological agnosticism' as a form of secularism. As
King has pointed out, 'one must be prepared to confront the secularist
context of religious studies head on and come to terms with the
provisionality and fallibility of one's own findings'. At the same time
this is not a reversion to a religionist position. Rather, it is to argue that
'religious studies' occupies a contested space in Western academic
circles and in that respect can also function as a mediator between two
different types of competing meta-discourses - the secular and the
religious. Moreover, King argues that the effectiveness of scholars of
religion resides precisely in an unwillingness to resolve this tension with
any degree of finality. 5
For King, this is not merely programmatic but practical, in so far as
he seeks to address an ethic sensitive to the power relationships in any
epistemology:
The introduction of a variety of indigenous epistemic traditions is, in
my view, the single most important step that postcolonial studies can
1 Ibid., p. 93. Not only Derrida, but Foucault and Deleuze have the critique of
Husserlian phenomenology as their point ofdeparture.
2 Ibid., p. 32.
3 Ibid., p. 104.
4 Ibid., p. 226.
5 King, 1999, op. cit., p. 52.
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take if it is to look beyond the Eurocentric foundations of its theories
and contest the epistemic violence of the colonial encounter.!
Motivated by a concern to 'transgress' the limits set up by the European
frarnings of much contemporary postcolonial theorising, King points out
that Buddhist philosophy and practice is also grounded upon a realisation
of the impermanent and fluctuating nature of the self and the non-
essentialist notion of co-dependent origination of all things. The sheer
radicalness of the Buddhist rejection of an abiding or essential self
prevents the postulation of a sovereign or autonomous subject at the
centre of history to the same degree as postcolonial critiques of
Orientalism, while divesting itself of the humanist-anti-humanist
imbroglio.
In a similar vein, Huntington has remarked that claims to
methodological purity necessarily embody - and mask - a fundamental
alienation from the objects of research to which they are applied, and
was moved to ask, 'Is it not likely that the understanding achieved by
such "controlled alienation" will be an alienated understanding?'2
In an analogous way, it seems that such 'controlled alienation' has, to
some degree, become part of the major developments in the research
program of the study of esotericism.3 This is made particularly evident in
the stated aims of the field's only (sub)department to be 'independent of
any worldview' and to encourage 'the professional detachment and
neutrality essential to academic research'.4 However, as a species of the
'writing of religion', it is in fact the practice of a particular, historical
discourse which distinguishes itself from the object of investigation and
1 Ibid., p. 199.
2 Huntington, Jr., 1989, Opt cit., p. 13.
3 Western esotericism's analogy to Buddhism can be further extended by the
'soteriological epistemologies' which are fundamental to both. For western
esotericism, see Faivre, 1994, op. cit., pp. 10-1, 11-2; for the distinct soteriological
epistemology ofBuddhism, see Huntington, Jr., 1988, op. cit., pp. 13-14,58-59. It is
interesting to note that neither the Fourth Way nor Buddhism have invested their
respective soteriological epistemology's with an essentialist subjectivity.
4 Afdeling, 2001, op. cit., p. 2.
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presents itself by necessity as detached from what it studies. Indeed, the
clearer the rift the more objective the discourse is perceived to be. I
Despite Hanegraaffs careful distinction between a defence of the
merits of an empirico-historical methodology against 'religionist'
methodologies and dogmatic attempts to impose such a methodology as
the only scholarly valid one, he cannot avoid the hermeneutical problem,
as framed by Gadamer, that 'this acknowledgment of the othemess of the
other, which makes him the object of objective knowledge, involves the
fundamental suspension of his claim to truth', which is here a
soteriological epistemology.2
The study of westem esotericism exists, then, in a state of 'controlled
alienation' in respect to its soteriological epistemology.3 Although there
have been developments since the creation of what amounts to an entire
and previously non-existent field by Faivre and Hanegraaff, especially
with regard to particular histories and biographies, this still holds in
terms of systematic studies. The work of Olav Hammer is a good
example. Like Hanegraaff, Hammer is also an academic formally part of
the first institutionalisation of esotericism in the context of the
university, examining further relationships between post-Enlightenment
esotericism and modemity.4 While insightful and a pioneer of
disciplinary terminology, and although he too rightly finds the
phenomenological, Le. descriptive, study unsatisfactory as a terminus, he
is equally imbricated in the same problems as those who identify the
study of religion with a privileging of Enlightenment values, with which
Flood, 1999, op. cit., p. 19. This is directly akin to de Certeau's understanding of
history as comprising a practice (discipline) and its results (discourse); cf., M. de
Certeau, The Writing ofHistory, New York, 1988, p. 23.
2 Hanegraaff, 1999, op. cit., p. 230 n.18 - contra Voss, 1998, op. cif.; H. Gadamer,
Truth and Method, trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming, London, 1975, p. 270.
3 Faivre, 1994, op. cit., pp. ID-ll, 11-12.
4 Whereas Hanegraaff - as might be expected - has provided an exhaustive account
of changes that occurred in the doctrinal contents of post-Enlightenment esotericism,
Hammer has concentrated on the continuities and transformations occurring to the
discursive strategies propagated since Blavatksy's synthesis, concentrating on the
appeal to tradition, scientism as a language of faith, and narratives of experience; cf.,
Hammer, 2001a, op. cit., pp. 48-49 n. 3, 53, 83.
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he explicitly identifies. l Moreover, he also seems to conflate the
phenomenological with the hermeneutical approaches to religion,
thereby sharply differentiating between the emic and the etic, or as he
tenns it, the 'analytical' perspective, and simultaneously abstracting this
'analysis' from a historical context and masking its affiliation from the
'writing of religions' discourse.2
As a result, Hammer's privileging of his particular etic perspective is
perpetually in danger of effacing and domesticating the emic perspective
into a 'cognitive illusion'. Similarly, Hanegraaffs earlier observation
that the '[n]et effect of a genetic approach ... may be to "demythologize"
certain convictions and render them highly, even intolerably improbable'
fits into this problematic.3 Certainly, his casual assertion that 'truth is not
a historical category' also suggests this.4
Flood's appeal to scholars of religion 'to develop methods sensitive
to context ... open to the "othemess" of the material or persons who are
the "object" of study and to recognise speaking and hearing subjects as
the place of meaning' is, I believe, as urgent a theoretical hiatus to
bridge as the secularisation of esotericism.5 At the very least, I hope that
this presentation of the Fourth Way will stimulate further research into a
dialogical approach to the study of western esotericism.
Hammer, 2001 a, op. cit., p. xiv. Those who prefer an explanatory approach to
religion in terms of a critique of ideology will be inclined to attach greater
importance to the Enlightenment tradition; cf., Molendjik, 1998, op. cit., p. 5.
2 loco cit.
3 Hanegraaff, 1995, op. cit., p. 105; cf., R.A. Segal, Religion and the Social Sciences,
Atlanta, 1989, pp. 75-86. A very good example of this in action, with regard to the
study of esoteric 'macrohistory', is L.S. De Camp, Lost Continents: The Atlantis
Theme in History, Science, and Literature, New York, 1970 passim.
4 Hanegraaff, 1998b, op. cif., p. 25.
5 Flood, 1999, op. cit., p. 35.
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